JEL Code
H55, J11, J18, D72, G28
Abstract
This paper examines how demographic imbalance and policy inertia undermine intergenerational equity in Canada’s partially funded and Spain’s pay-as-you-go pension systems. Despite structural differences, both nations transfer financial risks to Millennials and Gen Z due to aging populations, low fertility, and political resistance to reform. Using a comparative political economy framework and a stylized hyperbolic discounting model, the study shows institutional design alone cannot prevent unsustainability when incentives favor short-term gains. Policy recommendations include automatic adjustment mechanisms, independent fiscal councils, and private pension incentives.
Recommended Citation
Burgos Oliva, Javier E.
(2026)
"Millennials Will Pay the Price: Demographic Imbalance and Reform Inertia in Canada’s and Spain’s Pension Systems,"
Journal of New Finance: Vol. 4:
No.
1, Article 3.
DOI: 10.46671/2521-2486.1048
Available at:
https://jnf.ufm.edu/journal/vol4/iss1/3
Publication Date
6-22-2026